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Executive Summary
We analyze the implications of the interaction of market failures associated
with pollution and the environment, and market failures associated with the
development and diffusion of new technology. These combined market fail-
ures imply a strong prima facie case for publicpolicy intervention to foster
environmentally beneficial technology. Both theory and empirical evidence
suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance isinfluenced by
incentives from the market and from regulation. Environmental policy based
on incentive-based approaches is more likely tofoster cost-effective technol-
ogy innovation and diffusion than policy based oncommand and control
approaches. In addition, society's investments in the development and diffu-
sion of new environmentally beneficial technologies is very likely to be less
than socially desirable in the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental
policies that would otherwise foster such technology. Positive knowledge,
adoption spifiovers, and information problems further weaken innovation in-
centives. While environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties,
a long-term view suggests a strategy of experimentingwith different policy
approaches and systematically evaluating their success.
I.Introduction
In the last decade, discussions of energy and environmental policy
have become increasingly permeated by issues related to technological
change. Technological change is important to environmental policy for
three broad reasons. First, the environmental impact of social and eco-
nomic activity is profoundly affected by the rate and direction oftech-
nological change. New technologies may create or facilitate increased
pollution, or may mitigate or replace existing polluting activities. Also,
because many environmental problems and policy responses thereto
are evaluated over time horizons of decades orcenturies, the cumula-36 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
five impact of technological changes is likely to be large. Indeed, uncer-
tainty about the future rate and direction of technological change is
often the single greatest limitation to our ability to forecast future envi-
ronmental conditions (Weyant 1993, Energy Modeling Forum 1996).
Second, environmental policy interventions themselves createnew
constraints and incentives that affect the process of technological
change. These induced effects of environmental policy on technology
may have substantial implications for the normative analysis of policy
decisions. They may have quantitatively importantconsequences in
the context of cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses of such poli-
cies. They may also have broader implications for welfare analyses
because the process of technological change is characterized by exter-
nalities and market failures, with important welfareconsequences be-
yond those associated with environmental issues.
Finally, the seeming intractability of some energy and environmental
problems today, such as global climate change, combined with the long
time frame over which their ultimate consequences wifi play out, make
the development and deployment of new technologies attractive to
many as a major or perhaps primary policy response to those problems.
That is, policies whose direct purpose is generating technologymay be
as or more important for helping the environment, in the long run, as the
rules and regulations we normally think of as environmental policies.
This paper provides background for consideration of these issues.
We begin by discussing the key analytic issues that permeate policy
discussions occurring at the nexus between technology and environ-
mental policy. Section III then addresses the design of environmental
policy to incorporate and exploit its impacts on technology. Section IV
discusses the possibilities for policies designed to operate directlyon
technology to improve our ability to cope with environmental prob-




Environmental ExternalitiesEconomic analysis of environmental
policy is based on the idea that the potentially harmful consequences
of economic activities on the environment constitute an externality. AnTechnology Policy for Energy and the Environment 37
externality is an economically significanteffect of an activity, the conse-
quences of which are borne(at least in part) by a party or parties other
than the party who controls theexternality-producing activity. A fac-
tory that pollutes the air, water, orland imposes a cost on society. The
firm that owns the factory has aneconomic incentive to use only as
much labor or steel as it can productivelyemploy because those inputs
are costly to the firm. Insimpler terms, the cost to society of having
some of its labor andsteel used up in a given factory isinternalized
by the firm because it has to payfor those inputs. But the firm does
not (in the absence of appropriateenvironmental policy intervention)
have an economic incentive to minimizethe external costs of pollution.
Normative economics teaches thatexternalities are an example of
market failure, meaning that in the presenceof externalities, Adam
Smith's "invisible hand" may not operate toproduce outcomes that
are socially desirable.While the details and refinements are important,
all environmental policies, at their core, aredesigned to deal with this
externality problem, either by internalizingenvironmental costs so that
polluters will make efficient decisionsregarding their consumption of
environmental inputs, or else by imposing fromthe outside a level of
environmental pollution that policy makers believe tobe more efficient
than that otherwise chosen by firms.
In the short run, efficientenvironmental policy requires comparing
the marginal cost of reducing pollutionwith the marginal benefit of a
cleaner environment. All other factorsbeing equal, emissions of pol-
lutants that are very harmful shouldbe greatly restricted because
doing so produces large marginalbenefits. All other factors being
equal, emissions of pollutants that are verycostly to eliminate should
be tolerated because the marginal costof reducing them is high. This
cost could be in the form ofdecreased output of desired products
(e.g., a scrubber on an electric powerplant reduces its electricity
production from a given quantity offuel), increased use of other
variable inputs (e.g., eliminating certain gasesfrom the waste stream
in a smokestack may require morefuel to be burned), purchase
of specialized pollution-control equipment(e.g., catalytic converters
on automobiles), or substitutionof inferior or more expensive prod-
ucts or production methods toavoid pollution-causing products or
methods (e.g., less effective pesticides cominginto use when DDT
was banned).
Analytically, technology enters the picture bychanging the terms of
the trade-off between the marginal costof pollution control and its38 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
marginal social benefit. In particular,new technologysuch as new
pollution-control equipment, or new substitutes forenvironmentally
harmful productstypically reduces the marginalcost of achieving
any given level of pollution reduction. This means thata specified level
of environmental cleanup can be reduced at lowertotal cost to society,
and it also means that it will typically be efficientto choose a lower
level of pollution than would be efficient if cleanupwere more expen-
sive. Thus, in this simple static picture, improvedtechnology can be
good for both the firms that must meet environmentalmandates and
for the environment itself.
Economics of Technology 101
If new technology makes it less expensiveover time to reduce pollu-
tion, then it is obviously a good thing. If thiswere the end of the ana-
lytic story, then the only effect would beto convert the analysis of
environmental policy from a static cost/benefit trade-offto a dynamic
one. Policies to reduce pollution have two effects, however: they reduce
pollution today, and they also typically change the incentivesthat firms
face with regard to investingresources in developing new technology.
In particular, when firms facean incentive to reduce their emissions,
this simultaneously creates an incentive for themto find ways to reduce
pollution at lower cost. The fact that the developmentof such technol-
ogy will, over time, change the pollution benefit/cost calculusmeans
that choosing efficient environmental policy requiresan analysis of this
dynamic interaction.
Of course, new technology is not itself free. Toget to the point where
pollution is being reduced or some other benefit isrealized, two things
must happen, both of which require the investment ofresources. The
first step, which we will call innovation, involvesscientific or engi-
neering research to establish a new technical idea and thedevelopment
necessary to embody that idea in a commercial productor process.1
The second step is adoptionor diffusion, the process by which a new
product or process gradually replaces older technologyin multiple
firms and applications. Adoption is also costlybecause firms have to
learn about new technology, purchasenew equipment, and frequently
adapt it to their particular circumstances.
This leads us to the question of whetherwe can expect the "invisible
hand" to choose the right level of investmentin both innovation
and diffusion of new technology. It turnsout that, independent of theTechnology Policy for Energy and the Environment 39
externality associated with pollution, innovationand diffusion are both
characterized by externalities, as well as othermarket failures.
Knowledge ExternalitiesIn the case of pollution, the problem is that
a polluter imposes costs onothers and hence has an inadequate incen-
tive, from a social perspective, to reducethose costs. With respect to
technology, the problem is the reverse. A firmthat develops or imple-
ments a new technology typically createsbenefits for others and hence
has an inadequate incentive to increase thosebenefits by investing in
technology. Pollution is a negative externality,and so the "invisible
hand" allows too much of it. Technology createspositive externalities,
and so the "invisible hand" produces toolittle of it.2
With respect to innovation, the positiveexternality derives from the
public good nature of new knowledge. If Ibuild a better mousetrap,
and once the world beats a path to my door, mycompetitors can see
what I did and learn something from it.The process of competition
will typically drive me to sell my new device at aprice that captures
only a portion of its full value, so that consumersalso benefit from the
new technology. While wehave patents and other institutions that try
to protect firms' investments ininnovation, such protection is iriher-
ently imperfect. A successful innovatorwill capture some rewards, but
those rewards will always be only afractionand sometimes a very
small fractionof the overall benefits to societyof the innovation.
Hence, innovation creates positive externalitiesin the form of knowl-
edge spillovers for other firms, andspillovers of value or consumer
surplus for the users of the new technology.
Adoption ExternalitiesThe environmental and knowledgeexternali-
ties discussed above have beenunderstood for a long time and have
long been at the center of economic debatesabout technology policy.
More recently, we have come tounderstand some additional market
failures that operate in the adoption anddiffusion of new technology.
For several reasons, the cost or value of a newtechnology to one user
may depend on how manyother users have adopted the technology.
In general, users will be better off the moreother people use the same
technology. This benefit associated with theoverall scale of technology
adoption is sometimes referred to asdynamic increasing returns.
Dynamic increasing returns can be generatedby learning by using,
learning by doing, or network externalities.While the image of the40 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
world beating a path to the door of the successfulinnovator is a com-
pelling one, the diffusion of a new technology is typicallygradual. It
takes time for the many potentialusers to learn of the new technology,
try it, adapt it to their circumstances, and become convinced ofits supe-
riority. An important mechanism in this learningprocess is the obser-
vation of the adoption of the new technology by others.If a neighbor
or competitor tries something new and I see that it works, it becomes
much safer and easier for me to try it. Hence, the adopterof a new
technology creates a positive externality for others, inthe form of the
generation of information about the existence, characteristics, andsuc-
cess of the new technology. This phenomenon is often called learning
by using.
The supply-side counterpart, learning by doing, describeshow pro-
duction costs tend to fall as manufacturers gainproduction experience.
If this learning spills over to benefit other manufacturers,it can represent
an additional adoption externality. Finally, network externalities exist if
a product is technologically more valuable to an individualuser as other
users adopt a compatible product (for example, telephone andcomputer
networks). These phenomena can be critical to understandingthe ex-
isting technological system, forecasting how thatsystem might evolve,
and predicting the potential effect ofsome policy or event.
Incomplete InformationBoth innovation and diffusion ofnew tech-
nology are characterized by additional market failuresrelated to
incomplete information. While all investment is characterizedby un-
certainty, the uncertainty associated with thereturns to investment in
innovation is often particularly large. Also, informationabout the pros-
pects for the success of a given technology research investmentis asym-
metric in the sense that the developer of the technologyis in a better
position to assess its potential than are outsiders. A firmattempting to
raise investment capital to fund the development ofnew technology
will therefore find such investors skeptical aboutpromised returns and
likely to demand a premium for investment thatcarries such risks. This
likely imperfection in the market for capital for fundingtechnology
development exacerbates the spillover problem and thereforecontrib-
utes to our expectation that the "invisible hand"encourages too little
research and development.
With respect to technology adoption and diffusion,we have al-
ready discussed the fact that imperfect informationcan slow the
diffusion of new technology. Incomplete informationcan also fosterTechnology Policy for Energy and the Environment 41
principal-agent problems, as when a builder or landlord chooses the
level of investment in energy efficiency in a building, butthe energy
bills are paid by a later purchaser or a tenant. If thepurchaser has
incomplete information about the magnitude of theresulting energy
savings, the builder or landlord may not be able to recoverthe cost of
such investments and hence might not undertakethem. These market
failures with respect to adoption of new technology are partof the
explanation for the apparent paradox of underinvestment in energy-
saving technologies that appear cost-effective but are notwidely uti-
lized (Jaffe and Stavins 1994).
Thus, the interplay of technology and the environmentinvolves the
interaction of two analytically distinct but linked setsof market fail-
ures. The consequences ofthis interaction can be complex. For example,
the fact that markets underinvest in new technologystrengthens the
case for making sure thatenvironmental policy is designed to foster
rather than inhibit innovation. It may even mean thatthe social cost
of environmental policy is less than would otherwise appearbecause
part of the cost is in the form of investments ininnovation that yield
positive externalities outside the environmental arena.Whether this is
true or not will depend on, among other things,whether the increased
investment in environmental innovation brought forth byenvironmen-
tal policy comes at the expense of innovation in other areas.In practice,
it may be difficult to sort out all these effects,and it may be very diffi-
cult to do so with quantitative reliability.
Increasing Returns and Technology Lock-In
Increasing returns to adopting a particular technology or systemhave
been linked with so-called technology lock-in, inwhich a particular
product, technical standard, production process, or service isproduced
by a market, and it is difficult to move to an alternativecompeting
technology. Lock-in implies that, once led down aparticular technolog-
ical path, the barriers to switching may be prohibitive.For example,
the evolution of the internal combustion engineand automobiles has
included development of extensive infrastructure for thefueling and
repair of these engines. If a superior technology based on adifferent
fuel were developed, it would have to overcome the factthat gasoline
can be purchased on every street corner,but other fuels are not widely
available. In principle, this can lead to a "chicken and egg"problem,
in which people won't buy the new technologybecause a related42 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
infrastructure doesn't exist, but firms do not want to invest in this infra-
structure because there are no users.
Lock-in can be problematic if it would have been in the broader social
interest to adopt a fundamentally different pattern of technologicalca-
pacity. In turn, it raises the question of whether policy interventions
possibly involving central coordination and informationassessment;
direct technology subsidies; or publicly funded research, development,
demonstration, and procurement programsmight avoid undesirable
cases of technology lock-in by guiding technological paths in directions
superior to those that would be taken by the free market. Nonetheless,
an inefficient outcome need not necessarily result, and if it does, it may
not be lasting. Market forces will eventually tend to challenge thepre-
dominance of an inferior technology (see Ruttan 1997).
While the empirical literature is quitesparse, some studies have
explored the issue of increasing returns and technology lock-in for
competing technologies within the energy and environmentarenas,
including analysis of the internal combustion engine and alternative-
fuel vehicles (Cowan and Hulten 1996), technologies for electricitygen-
eration (Islas 1997), nuclear power reactor designs (Cowan 1990), and
the transition from hydrocarbon-based fuels (Kemp 1997). Ata more
aggregate level, there has been much discussion about whether it is
possible for developing countries to take less environmentally damag-
ing paths of development than were taken by currently industrialized
countries, for example, by relying less on fossil fuels.3
We are far from having a well-established theoreticalor empirical
basis for deciding when intervention is preferable toan unregulated
market outcome in the face of technology lock-inor the form that the
intervention should take. Certainly, the observation thatany nongaso-
line automobile technology faces a significant barrier in the form of
lack of infrastructure is insufficient as a basis for concluding that other
technologies are, in fact, socially superior. David (1997,p. 36) suggested
that perhaps the most productive question to ask from the beginning
is, How can we identify situations in which it is likely thatat some
future time individuals really would be better off had another equilib-
rium been selected? One thing that public policy can do, Davidsug-
gested, is to try to delay the market from irreversible commitments
before enough information has been obtained about the likely im-
plications of an early, precedent-setting decision.4 One couldconstrue
current policy discussions surrounding certain biotechnology develop-
ments as potentially doing just that.Technology Policy for Energy and the Environment 43
The Induced Innovation Approach
The recognition that R&D is a profit-motivatedinvestment activity
leads to the hypothesis that the rate and directionof innovation are
likely to respond to changes in relative prices.Because environmental
policy implicitly or explicitly makes environmentalinputs more expen-
sive, the induced-innovation hypothesis suggests animportant path-
way for the interaction ofenvironmental policy and technology, and
for the introduction of impacts ontechnological change as a criterion
for evaluation of different policy instruments.The induced-innovation
hypothesis was first articulated by Sir JohnHicks:
[A] change in the relative prices of thefactors of production is itself a spur to
invention, and to invention of a particularkinddirected to economizing the
use of a factor which has becomerelatively expensive. (Hicks 1932, p. 124)
Hicks did not link the induced-innovation hypothesisin a formal way
to the research process or toprofit-maximizing R&D decisions by firms,
but others have. Binswanger and Ruttan(1978) summarize this litera-
ture. The general approach is to postulate ameta production function
according to which investing in R&D changes the parametersof a pro-
duction function. Unfortunately, theoretical conclusionsregarding the
induced effect of changes in factor prices on the parametersof the pro-
duction function are sensitive to the specificationof the meta produc-
tion function governing the research process.
A natural way to move the modelingof induced innovation to the
microeconomic level is to recognize that factor-savingtechnological
change comes about mostly through theintroduction of new capital
goods that embody different input ratios. Theseinput ratios can then
be thought of as attributes or characteristicsof the capital goods, as
Lancaster (1971) did. Thirtle and Ruttan (1987)provided a review of
the nonenvironmental literature on inducedinnovation. Much of this
work is in the agricultural area, in which excellentmicrodata has long
provided many opportunities for empiricalwork on innovation and
diffusion.5 In general, available empirical analysesconfirm that factor
price changes are associated with factor-savingtechnological change.
One of the greatest challenges in testing theinduced-innovation hy-
pothesis specifically with respect to environmentalinducement is the
difficulty of measuring the extent or intensityof inducement across
firms or industries (Jaffe et al. 1995). Ideally, onewould like to look at
the relationship between innovation andthe perceived value to the44 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
firm of reducing pollution. In practice, this perceived valueis not easily
observed. Consequently, one must use proxies, suchas characteristics
of environmental regulations, expenditureson pollution abatement,
or prices of polluting inputs (for example, energy). In the follow-
ing paragraphs, we review studies that have usedeach of these
approaches.
Many have written about the impact of environmentalregulation
on productivity and investment.6 To the extent that regulation inhibits
investment and/or slows productivity growth, thiscan be viewed as
indirect evidence suggesting that induced innovation effectson the rate
of technological change are either smallor are outweighed by other
costs of regulation. Results on this issue seem to be industry and meth-
odology dependent. For measuring the characteristics ofenvirorm-ien-
tal regulations, studies have used expert judgments aboutrelative
regulatory stringency in different states (Gray and Shadbegian1998),
number of enforcement actions (Gray and Shadbegian1995), attain-
ment status with respect to environmental laws and regulations
(Greenstone 2002), and specific regulatory events (Bermanand Bui
1998). Berman and Bui (1998) found significant productivityincreases
associated with air pollution regulation in the oil-refining industry,but
Gray and Shadbegian (1998) found that pollution abatementinvest-
ment crowds out productive investment almost entirely in thepulp
and paper industry. Greenstone (2002) found that air pollutionregula-
tion has a statistically significant but very small impacton overall costs,
implying a small negative productivity impact.
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) showed a strong association between
pollution abatement expenditures and the rate ofpatenting in related
technology fields. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) examined thecorrelation
between pollution expenditures by industry and indicators ofinnova-
tion more broadly. They found a significant correlation within indus-
tries over time between the rate of expenditureon pollution abatement
and the level of R&D spending. They did not, however,find evidence
of an effect of pollution control expenditureon overall patenting.
Evidence of inducement has also been sought byexamining the
response to changing energy prices. Newell et al. (1999) examined
the extent to which the energy efficiency of themenu of home appli-
ances available for sale has changed in response toenergy prices,
using a model of induced innovationas changing characteristics of
capital goods. In terms of the efficiency of theaverage model offered,
they found that energy efficiency in 1993 would have beenaboutTechnology Policy for Energy and the Environment 45
one-quarter to one-half lower in air conditionersand gas water heaters
if energy prices had stayed at their 1973levels, rather than following
their historical path. Most of the response to energyprice changes came
within less than five years of those changes.
Popp (2001, 2002) looked more broadly at energyprices and energy-
related innovation. Using energy-related patents as a proxyfor energy
innovation, he found that approximatelyone-third of the overall re-
sponse of energy use to pricesis associated with induced innovation,
with the remaining two-thirds associated with factorsubstitution. Be-
cause energy patents are likely to measure energyinnovation only with
substantial error, one might interpret this result asplacing a lower
bound on the fraction of the overall response of energy useto changing
prices that is associated with innovation.
In summary, there is considerable directand indirect evidence that
the rate and direction of technological changerespond to economic
incentives. On the time scale of decades, this responseis quantitatively
significant in the sense that improvements inefficiency associated with
induced technological change are on the sameorder of magnitude as
the improvements that appear to be occurringautonomously. This
finding has important policy implications. First, it meansthat the long-
run effectiveness of policiesthat increase the price of energy and other
environmental inputs is likely to be greater thanmight be expected
based on observed short-run responses.8 One canalso turn this obser-
vation around and note that, for policy tohave maximum impact, long
periods of time will be required. Althoughempirical studies do not
provide strong evidence on this point, thegeneral observation that
technology responds to incentives suggests thatthe relative effective-
ness of different policy instrumentsin inducing innovation and tech-
nology diffusion may be an importantconsideration in policy choice.
The Evolutionary Approach to Innovation
It should be clear by now that theneoclassical economic analysis of
these issues rests onsome might say, ismired inthe analytical con-
cept of market failure. That concept rests,in turn, on the notion that
in the absence of such failures, markets canbe expected to produce
socially efficient outcomes. A key tenet in thisanalysis of efficiency is
an assumption that firms'decisions regarding innovation and adop-
tion of new technology can be successfullyanalyzed through the lens
of profit maximization. While viewing R&D as aprofit-motivated46 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
investment activity comes naturally to most economists, thelarge un-
certainties surrounding the outcomes of R&D investments makeit very
difficult for firms to make optimizing R&D decisions.Accordingly,
Nelson and Winter(1982)used Herbert Simon's idea of bourLdedlyra-
tional firms that engage in "satisficing" rather thanoptimizing behav-
ior (Simon1947)to build an alternative model of the R&Dprocess. In
this evolutionary model, firms use "rules of thumb" and"routines" to
determine how much to invest in R&D and howto search for new
technologies. The empirical predictions of this model dependon the
nature of the rules of thumb that firms actuallyuse (Nelson and Winter
1982,Winter et al.2000).
Because firms are not optimizing,a logical consequence of the evolu-
tionary model is that it cannot be presumed that theimposition of a
new external constraint (for example, a new environmental rule)neces-
sarily reduces profits. There is at least the theoreticalpossibility that
the imposition of such a constraint could bean event that forces a satis-
ficing firm to rethink its strategy, with the possibleoutcome being the
discovery of a new way of operating that is actuallymore profitable
for the firm. This possibility of environmental regulationleading to a
win-win outcome in which pollution is reduced and profitsare in-
creased is discussed below.
The evolutionary approach replaces optimizing firmswith satisficing
firms and thereby admits greaterscope for a variety of consequences
when the firm's environment is modified. Satisficing firmsmay miss
opportunities for increased profits simply because they donot look
very hard for such opportunities as long as things are going reasonably
well. An external shock suchas a new environmental constraint can
therefore constitute a stimulus to new search, possibly leadingto dis-
covery of previously undetected profit opportunities. This observation
forms the basis for the normative observation thatenvironmental
regulation may not be as costly as we expect because theimposition
of the new constraint may lead to the discovery ofnew ways of doing
things. In the end, these newways of doing things might actually
be more profitable than the oldways, leading to an asserted win-win
outcome:
It is sometimes argued that companies must, by thevery notion of profit seek-
ing, be pursuing all profitable innovation... . In this view, if complying with
environmental regulation can be profitable, in thesense that a company can
more than offset the cost of compliance, then why is such regulation necessary?
The possibility that regulation might act asa spur to [profitable] innovation
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make optimal choices. ... [T]heactual process of dynamic competition is char-
acterized by changing technological opportunitiescoupled with highly incom-
plete information, organizational inertia and controlproblems reflecting the
difficulty of aligning individual, group and corporateincentives. Companies
have numerous avenues for technological improvement,and limited attention.
(Porter and van der Linde 1995, pp. 98-99)
Porter and other win-win theorists argue that inthis nonoptimizing
world, regulation may lead to "innovation offsets"that "not only lower
the net cost of meeting environmental regulations,but can even lead
to absolute advantages over firmsin foreign countries not subject to
similar regulations" (Porter and van der Linde 1995, p.98). Of course,
the fact that firms engage in nonoptimizingbehavior creates a possibil-
ity for profit improvements, without suggestingthat such improve-
ments would be the norm, would besystematic, or would even be
likely.
Quantitative evidence is limited. Porter and vander Linde (1995)
provided numerous case studies of particular firms whodeveloped or
adopted new technology in response to regulation and appearto have
benefited as a result. On the other hand, Palmer et al.(1995) surveyed
firms affected by regulationincluding thosecited by Porter and van
der Linde as success storiesand found that mostfirms say that the
net cost to them of regulation is, in fact,positive. Boyd and McClelland
(1999) and Boyd and Pang (2000) employ dataenvelopment analysis
to evaluate the potential at paper andglass plants for improvements
that both increase productivity and reduce energy use orpollution.
They find that the paper industry could reduceinputs and pollution
by 2 to 8 percent without reducing productivity.Other results dis-
cussed above suggest that the effect of environmentalregulation on
productivity is case-dependent and in many cases seems tobe
small.
Summary of Analytical Issues
The premise of this paper is that technological changeis important
for environmental policy and also that analysisof policy for energy
and the environment benefits from the perspectiveof the economics
of technological change. Our general approach is toview technological
change relative to the environment as occurring atthe nexus of two dis-
tinct and important market failures: pollution represents anegative exter-
nality, and new technology generates positiveexternalities. Hence, new
technology for pollution reduction is, from ananalytical perspective,48 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
doubly underprovided by markets. This suggests that the efficiencyof
environmental policy depends on its consequences for technological
change and also that there is a potential role for policy aimed directlyat
the stimulation of environmentally beneficial technological change.
The subsequent sections look at these two policy approachesin more
detail. Before doing so, it is perhaps useful to summarizewhat is
known and unknown about the basic validity of the analyticalperspec-
tive that we propose. At a fundamental level,a lot depends on one's
view of the basic presumption that firms' behaviorcan be successfully
modeled as acting rationally subject to the information constraintsun-
der which they operate. Rational firms willeventuallyrespondto
economic incentives, no matter how much information problemscon-
strain their behavior, On the other hand, firms operating ina fog of
uncertainty and asymmetric information may respondso slowly and
poorly as to make models based on profit maximization unhelpfulas
a practical matter.
Viewed through this lens, the evidenceon induced innovation and
the win-win hypothesis is a case of a "partially full glass" that analysts
see as mostly full or mostly empty, depending on their perspective.
Apparently contradictory observations are, in effect, both trueto a cer-
tain extent. Examples of this dialectic are provided in table 2.1 (inan
intentionally provocative and perhaps imprecise manner).
III.Effects of Environmental Policy on Technological Change9
As noted above, if technological change responds to incentives,then
it follows that different environmental policy instrumentswhichaf-
fect the incentives to develop and implementnew technologies in dif-
ferent ways and to a varying extentwill have differing effectson the
rate and direction of technological change. Many studies in environ-
mental economics attempt to analyze these differences. While thisliter-
ature is not entirely consistent in its conclusions, there isa general
tendency that can be identified. Flexible policy instruments,based on
economic incentives rather than mandatory compliance methods,are
more likely to encourage the development and implementation of cost-
effective technology.
Overview of the Issues
For purposes of examining the link between environmental policyin-
struments and technological change, policies can be characterizedasTechnology Policy for Energy and the Environment 49
Table 2.1
Overview of conclusions on induced innovation and thewin-win hyphothesis
Areas of agreement
Historical evidence indicates that a significant but notnecessarily predominant frac-
tion of innovation in the energy and environment areais induced.
Environmental regulation is likely to stimulate innovation andtechnology adoption
that will facilitate environmental compliance.
Much existing environmental regulation uses inflexiblemechanisms likely to stifle
innovation; "incentive-based" mechanisms are likely to be moreconducive to
innovation.
Firms are boundedly rational so that external constraints maysometimes stimulate





Innovation in response to regula-
tion is evidence of offsets that
significantly reduce or eliminate
the cost of regulation.
Pollution is evidence of waste,
suggesting that cost-reducing
innovation in response to regula-
tion might be the norm.
Existing productivity or cost
studies do not capture innova-
tion offsets.
There is much evidence of inno-
vation offsets, even though
existing regulations are badly
designed. This suggests that off-
sets from good regulation would
be large.
Case studies are highly selective.
Firms believe regulation is
costly.
When cost-reducing innovation
occurs, the opportunity cost of
R&D and management effort
makes a true win-win outcome
unlikely.
Costs are costs; even if firms are
not at the frontier, the side
effects of pollution reduction
could just as easily be bad as
good.
Existing productivity and cost
studies suggest that innovation
offsets have been very small.
Since there is agreement that
bad regulations stifle innovation,
the apparent beneficial effects of
existing regulation show only
that case studies can be very
misleading.
either command-and-control or market-basedapproaches. Market-
based instrumentssuch as pollution charges,subsidies, tradeable
permits, and some types of information programscanencourage
firms or individuals to undertakepollution-control efforts that are in
their own interests and that collectively meetpolicy goals (Stavins
2003). Command-and-control regulationstend to force firms to take on
similar shares of the pollution-control burden,regardless of the cost.
They often do this by setting uniformstandards for firms, the most
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prevalent of which are performance- and technology-basedstandards.
But holding all firms to the same targetcan be expensive and, in some
circumstances, counterproductive because standardstypically exact
relatively high costs by forcing some firms toresort to unduly expen-
sive means of controlling pollution. Because thecosts of controlling
emissions may vary greatly among firms, andeven among sources
within the same firm, the appropriate technology inone situation may
not be cost-effective in another.
All these forms of intervention have the potential forinducing or
forcing some amount of technological change because, bytheir very
nature, they induce or require firms to do things they wouldnot
otherwise do. While even technology-based standardsmay provide
an incentive for innovation that reduces the cost of using specific
technologies, performance standards allowa wider range of control
options and innovation opportunities. Performance andtechnology
standards can be explicitly designed to be "technology forcing,"man-
dating performance levels thatare not currently viewed as technologi-
cally feasible or mandating technologies thatare not fully developed.
One problem with these approaches, however, is that whileregulators
can typically assume that some amount of improvementover existing
technology will always be feasible, it is impossibleto know how much.
Standards must be made unambitious, or else theyrun the risk of being
ultimately unachievable, leading to political andeconomic disruption
(Freeman and Haveman 1972).
Technology standards can be particularly problematicbecause they
tend to freeze the development of technologies that mightotherwise
result in greater levels of control. Under regulations thatare targeted
at technologies, as opposed to emissions levels,no financial incentive
exists for businesses to exceed control targets, and the adoptionof new
technologies is discouraged. Undera best available control technology
(BACT) standard, a business that adoptsa new method of pollution
abatement may be "rewarded" by being held toa higher standard of
performance and thereby not benefit financially from itsinvestment,
except to the extent that its competitors haveeven more difficulty
reaching the new standard (Hahn and Stavins 1991).On the other hand,
if third parties can invent and patent better equipment,they canin
theoryhave a ready market. Under such conditions,a BACT type of
standard can provide a positive incentive for technologyinnovation.
Unfortunately, as we note below, there has beenvery little theoretical
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In contrast with such command-and-control regulations,market-
based instruments can provide powerful incentives for companies to
adopt cheaper and better pollution-control technologiesbecause, with
market-based instruments, it pays firms to clean up a bit moreif a
sufficiently low-cost technology or process for doing so can beidenti-
fied and adopted.
Technology Invention and Innovation
Although decisions about technology invention andcommercialization
are partly a demand-side functionof anticipated sales (adoption), the
relevant literature comparing the effects of alternativeenvironmental
policy instruments has given greater attention to the supplyside, focus-
ing on incentives for firm-level decisions to incurR&D costs in the
face of uncertain outcomes. Early theoretical work (Magat1978, 1979)
compared taxes, subsidies, permits, effluent standards, andtechnology
standards, and showed that all but technology standardswould induce
innovation biased toward emissions reduction.1°
More recent theoretical work has found that the rankingof environ-
mental policy instruments in terms of their ability to induceemissions-
reducing innovation depends on circumstances (Fischer etal. 2003,
Ulph 1997). This is partly due to the fact that any policythat controls
emissions has two conflicting effects in terms of innovationincentives.
On the one hand, by making pollution costly, it creates anincentive
for emissions-reducing innovation. On the other hand, byincreasing
the overall cost of production, it tends to reduce thefirms' output or
sales, which reduces the incentive to perform R&D.Katsoulacos and
Xepapadeas (1996) found that a simultaneous tax on pollutionemis-
sions and subsidy for environmental R&D maybe better suited to over-
coming the joint market failure (negative externalityfrom pollution
and positive externality or spillover effects of R&D).
There has been exceptionally little empirical analysisdirectly of the
effects of alternative policy instruments on technologyinnovation in
pollution abatement, principally because of the paucityof available
data. One study by Bellas (1998) carried out a statisticalanalysis of the
costs of flue gas desulfurization (scrubbing)installed at coal-fired
power plants in the United Statesunder the new-source performance
standards of the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Acts, but it failed tofind any
evidence of the effects of scrubber vintage on cost,suggesting little
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Although there has been very little analysis in the context of
pollution-abatement technologies, there is more extensive literature
on the effects of alternative policy instruments on the innovation of
energy-efficiency technologies because data have been available. As
discussed above in the context of induced innovationmore generally,
there is evidence that increases in the price of energy have induced
technological improvements in energy efficiency. There has also been
some analysis of the effect of command-and-control regulations on en-
ergy efficiency.11 Of course, regulations designed to improve energy
efficiency, such as appliance and automobile efficiency standards,
have historically been implemented in response to risingenergy prices,
making it difficult to distinguish empirically the effect of thesestan-
dards from the effect of rising energy prices. It is clear that minimum
efficiency standards can increase the average efficiency of themenu
of available equipment, if only by eliminating the least efficient models
from the market (Newell et al. 1999). There is little doubt, forexam-
ple, that the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for
automobiles have made the automobile fleet more gasoline-efficient
than it would otherwise have been. What is less clear is theextent
to which such standards stimulate the development of new technol-
ogy that makes possible improvements in the efficiency of the most
efficient models, and whether comparable reductions in gasolineuse
could have been achieved at lower cost using incentive-based policy
instruments.
Technology Diffusion
The predominant theoretical framework for analyses of diffusion ef-
fects has been what could be called the discrete technology choice
model: firms contemplate the use of a certain technology that reduces
marginal costs of pollution abatement and hasa known fixed cost
associated with it. While some authors have presented this approach
as a model of innovation, it is more appropriately viewed as a model
of adoption. With such models, several theoretical studies have found
that the incentive for the adoption of new technologies is greater under
market-based instruments than under direct regulation (Zerbe 1970,
Downing and White 1986, Milliman and Prince 1989, Jung et al. 1996).
There is also empirical evidence regarding the effects of regula-
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regulatory approaches in this regard. Two prominentexamples of
incentive-based environmental regulation in the UnitedStates are the
phase-out of lead in gasoline in the 1980s and thereduction in sulfur
dioxide emissions from power plants in the late 1990s,both of which
were brought about using systemsof tradeable permits. In both cases,
empirical analysis shows that the incentives created bythe permit sys-
tem induced technology to (1) spread morerapidly, and (2) spread
more efficiently in the sense that itincreased incentives for firms to
adopt compliance options that were cheaper for them(Kerr and Newell
2003, Keohane 2001).
The effect of energy price changes and regulationsaimed at improv-
ing the energy efficiency of buildings,appliances, and industrial pro-
cesses has been investigated byJaffe and Stavins (1995), Hassett and
Metcalf (1995), and Anderson and Newell (2003).In addition to the
general finding that higher energy prices increaseand adoption costs
decrease the extent of adoption ofenergy-conservation technology
(e.g., building insulation, more efficient homeappliances, more effi-
cient industrial motors), an interestingfinding in this line of research
is that the adoption of these technologiesis more sensitive to the cost
of the equipment than it is to the expected costof energy. This finding
implies that a policy of subsidizing the purchaseof new efficient equip-
ment may be more effective than a policyof taxing resource use, for
policies that should in theory create the samemagnitude of economic
incentive. There are at least three possible explanationsfor this diver-
gence. One possibility is abehavioral bias that causes purchasers to
focus more on up-front cost than they do on thelifetime operating costs
of an investment. An alternative view is thatpurchasers focus equally
on both, but uncertaintyabout future energy prices or whether they
will face these costs (e.g., because they could move)makes them give
less weight to energy prices than they do tocapital cost, which is
known. A final interpretation might be that consumershave reasonably
accurate expectations about future energy prices,and their decisions
reflect those expectations, but the proxies for theseexpectations that
are used by researchers areflawed, causing their measured effect .to
be smaller than their true effect.'2
Although empirical evidence indicates that subsidies maybe more
effective than comparable taxes in encouragingtechnology diffu-
sion, it is important to recognize somedisadvantages of such subsidy
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provide incentives to reduce utilization. Second, technologysubsidies
and tax credits can require large public expendituresper unit of effect
because consumers who would have purchased the producteven
in the absence of the subsidy still receive it. In thepresence of fiscal
constraints on public spending, this raises questions about the fea-
sibility of subsidies that would be sizable enoughto have desired
effects.
What about conventional command-and-control approaches? Jaffe
and Stavins (1995) and Kemp (1997) examined the effects ofmore con-
ventional regulations on technology diffusion in the form of building
codes with energy-efficiency provisions. They foundno discernible ef-
fects. It is unclear to what extent this is due to inability tomeasure the
true variation across states in the effectiveness of codes or to codes that
were in many cases not binding relative to typical practice. This isa
reminder, however, that although price-based policies will always
have some effect, typical command-and-control approachesmay have
little effect if they are set below existing standards ofpractice or below
the level induced by price expectations.
Attention has also been given to the effectson energy-efficiency tech-
nology diffusion of voluntary environmentalprograms. Howarth et al.
(2000) examined two voluntary programs of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency: the Green Lights and Energy Starprograms, both
of which are intended to encourage greater private industryuse of
energy-saving technologies. A natural question from economicsis,
Why would firms carry out additional technology investmentsas part
of a voluntary agreement? The authors respond that thereare a set
of agency problems that inhibit economically wise adoptionof some
technologies. For example, most energy-saving investmentsare small,
and senior staff may rationally choose to restrict funds forsmall proj-
ects that cannot be perfectly monitored. The Green Lightsprogram
may be said to attempt to address this type of agency problem by pro-
viding information on savings opportunities at the level of thefirm
where decisions are made.
Another body of research has examined the effectson technology
diffusion of command-and-control environmental standardswhen
they are combined with "differential environmental regulations."In
many situations where command-and-control standards have been
used, the required level of pollution abatement has beenset at a far
more stringent level for new sources than for existing ones. There is
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have lengthened the time before plants were retired (Maloney and
Brady 1988, Nelson et al. 1993). Also, this dual system can actually
worsen pollution by encouraging firms to keep older,dirtier plants in
operation (Stewart 1981, Gollop and Roberts 1983, McCubbins et al.
1989).
Although the empirical literature on the effects of policy instruments
on technology diffusion by no means settlesall the issues that emerge
from the related theoretical studies, a consistent theme that runs
through both the pollution-abatement and energy-efficiency empirical
analyses is that market-based instruments are decidedly more effec-
tive than command-and-control instruments in encouraging the cost-
effective adoption and diffusion of relevant new technologies. This
conclusion harks back to our summary at the end of Section II: while
there is considerable dispute about the extent to which new technology
reduces the social cost of environmental compliance, there is essentially
no dispute that flexible, incentive-oriented policyapproaches are the
most likely to foster such lower-cost compliance paths.
IV.Environmental Technology Policy
The previous section explored the potential for increasing the long-run
cost-effectiveness of environmental policy by designing it explicitly to
foster technological advance. Given that the development of environ-
mentally beneficial technology is subject to two interacting market fail-
ures, however, it is likely that the rate of investmentin such technology
is below the socially optimal level, and it is unlikely that environmental
policy alone creates the proper incentives. Hence, the optimal set of
public policies likely also includes instruments designed explicitly to
increase innovation and technology diffusion, as distinct from environ-
mental policies that stimulate new technology as a side effect of inter-
nalizing the environmental externality.
Of course, one way to foster environmental technology is to foster
technology in general and to assume that some portion of the stimu-
lated development will be in the environment area. The arguments for
generally greater public investment in technology infrastructure are
well known and have been the subject of numerous papers in the Inno-
vation Policy and the Economy series. Therefore, we will not attempt here
to analyze the gamut of technology policy. We will focusinstead on
the potential for policies aimed explicitly at the development and diffu-
sion of environmentally benign and/or energy-saving technology.56 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
There is a strong strain in U.S. technology policy of avoiding particu-
lar technical areas for support, that is, "picking winners." There are,
however, two interrelated reasons why technology policy narrowly fo-
cused on energy and environment is likely to be socially desirable. First
is the environmental externality itself, which makes environment, in
effect, an area of government procurement like defense andspace, and
hence a suitable area for focused governmental technology efforts. Sec-
ond, in the area of global climate changearguably the most signifi-
cant long-run environmental threat we facethe United States has
largely put off, for the moment, environmental policy intervention.
Hence, there is little environmental policyinduced incentive to de-
velop technologies that reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. This stance
says, in effect, that this is a potentially serious problem, but it is so far
off and the uncertainties are so large that we will limit policy interven-
tion to research and development for the moment. Hence, policy to
foster greenhouse-gas-reducing technology is the main policy lever
available.
Policies Aimed at Stimulating Innovation
Policies that internalize the cost of environmental harm stimulate the
creation of environment-friendly technology by increasing the demand
for low-cost pollution-reduction methods. This increases the return to
developing such technologies. The spillover problem implies that firms
can expect to capture only a portion of that return, but a portion of a
large return is still more of an incentive than a portion of a small return.
Government can also stimulate innovation through the supply side,
either by making it less expensive for firms to undertake research in
this area or by performing such research in public institutions.
When research produces potentially large social benefits but is so
prone to the spillover problem that firms will not view it as profitable,
there is an analytical basis for performing that research in the public
sector or through direct private research contracts. There is a long tradi-
tion of performing such basic research at the U.S. National Energy Lab-
oratories. The national labs, such as Lawrence Berkeley, Brookhaven,
Oak Ridge, Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and the National Energy
Technology Lab are typically owned by the U.S. Department of Energy
but operated by either a private firm or a university. Most of there-
search on energy and environment that is performed at these facilities
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As noted above, an additional reasonfor directed public funding on
specific energy-environment topics is that, atthe moment, the demand-
side incentive to developgreenhouse-gas-reducing technologies is lim-
ited because there are inadequate policiesfor internalizing the climate
change externality.
As long as firms see some potentialfor private return, public policy
can counterbalancethe spillover problem by subsidizingresearch in
the private sector rather thanperforming it in the public sector. The
advantage of this approach is that privatefirms may have better infor-
mation than the government about thelikely commercial feasibility of
different technologies and hence be moresuccessful at choosing which
technologies to pursue. Such subsidies cantake the form of fairly gen-
eral tax credits, or matching funds that areprovided to firms for spe-
cific research proposals. In areas wherethe national labs have specific
expertise, joint industry-governmentresearch can be undertaken using
the mechanism of the CooperativeResearch and Development Agree-
ment (CRADA). Finally, becausethe supply of appropriately trained
scientists and engineers is relativelyinelastic in the short run, there is
a danger that anyincreased expenditure on research in a given area
will be at least partly consumed by anincrease in wages (Goolsbee
1998), rather than going to moreresearch effort. This tendency can be
offset if subsidies to or expenditures onresearch are complemented by
subsidies for education and training inthe appropriate areas.13
Policies Aimed at Stimulating Adoption
There is a long history of public supportfor research in the United
States. There has been less policy consensusregarding the desirability
of using public policy to speed theadoption of new technology. Be-
cause of the positiveinformation externality associated withtechnol-
ogy adoption, thereis a valid analytical basis forconsidering such
policy. Also, if learning curves or other sourcesof dynamic increasing
returns are important, therecould be large social benefits associated
with speeding diffusion of newenergy-saving or otherwise environ-
mentally beneficial technologies. On theother hand, the possibility of
technology lock-in makes this apotentially two-edged sword. If the
government encourages the diffusionof a particular technology, it is
possible that it could become soentrenched in the marketplace that it
stifles the development of some other,superior technology. This dan-
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To maximize the exploitation of dynamicincreasing returns, it is desir-
able to focus on the development ofa small number of promising tech-
nologies. Yet to avoid accidentally helpingto entrench the wrong
technology, it is desirable for policyto be "technology neutral," that
is, encouraging all efforts that achievespecified objectives without fo-
cusing on a particular approach.
Thus, a potential trade-off exists betweentechnology portfolio diver-
sification and increasing returns froma focus on a small number of
technologies. In addition, given limited publicresources, the govern-
ment clearly cannot subsidize allnew technologies, so there is a need
to focus scarce resources on commercializationopportunities for which
there is the clearest need fora public role. As stated earlier, this case
will be more compelling the lowerare the private incentives for adop-
tion, as in the case of environmental problemsthat have not otherwise
been fully priced into private decisions.
As with research, the governmentcan encourage adoption both in
its own operations and by subsidizingthe efforts of others. Because
the government is a very large landlord,vehicle operator, and user of
many other kinds of equipment, its decision to purchasecertain tech-
nologies for its own use could havea significant effect on the rate of
diffusion of that technology. Technology diffusion,and achievement
of any associated benefits of dynamicincreasing returns, can also be
encouraged with tax credits that reduce the effectivepurchase price of
new equipment that meets specified criteria.
Because a major aspect of the market failurein technology diffusion
is imperfect information, another category of policyto encourage diffu-
sion is information provision. Withrespect to technologies that appear
cost-effective but are not yet widely utilized,this kind of policy over-
comes the apparent market failure without putting thegovernment in
the position of betting on particular technologies.
Finally, command-and-control regulationscan also be used to try to
force the diffusion of particular technologies,if only by removing less
expensive and less environmentally beneficialcompeting technologies
from the market. The Corporate AverageFuel Economy (CAFE) stan-
dards have been designed to forcean improvement in auto efficiency.
Energy efficiency standards have also beenimplemented for major
home appliances. In principle, suchstandards can be beneficial bycon-
serving the need for every individual to undertakethe information and
assessment process inherent in trading off capital andenergy operating
costs. However, they also raise the risk of going beyondan economi-
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Table 2.2
Overview of U.S. federal climate technology R&D and adoption initiatives
Climate-related technology R&D spending ($1.1 billion/year)
Energy conservation S3%
Renewables supply 37%
Carbon capture and sequestration 5%
Basic science 3%
EPA science and technology 2%
Forest, range, agriculture
Energy Information Administration <1%
Climate-related technology adoption spending ($1 billion/year)
State energy efficiency grants 33%
Renewables production tax incentives 24%
Cogeneration production tax incentives 22%
EPA information/voluntary programs 9%
Hybrid/fuel cell car tax credits 8%
Landifil gas production tax credit 4%
Solar homes tax credits 1%
product choice and undesirable costs on what is a very heterogeneous
population of adopters.
Current Climate Policy Efforts
As an illustration of the range of federal technology policy initiatives
related to energy and environment, table 2.2 summarizes current fed-
eral climate change initiatives. Based on the fiscal year 2003 (FY03) bud-
get request (Connaughton 2002), about $1 billion will be spent on
research, and a similar amount will be spent on technology diffusion.
On the research side, a little over half relates to energy conservation,
with most of the remainder going toward sources of renewable energy.
On the diffusion side, a little over half goes toward tax credits for re-
newable energy production, cogeneration, hybrid/fuel cell autos, land-
fill gas production, and solar homes. About one-third of the money
goes for state energy efficiency grants,and 9 percent for EPA informa-
tion and voluntary programs such as Green Lights.
Assessment
Generally, with science and technology programs, systematic assess-
ment efforts are woefully lacking. Because success is uncertain anddif-
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and technology adoption have resisted efforts to measure their output
against quantitative benchmarks, as is required by the Government
Performance and Results Act (Jaffe 1998, 2002). Granted, such evalua-
tion is very difficult, and there is a real danger that imperfectassess-
ment methods will distort policy by encouraging efforts that "look
good" on the evaluation, even if such efforts are not ideally suited to
the program's mission. But continuous, systematic, quantitativeassess-
ment is the only way that the relative effectiveness of different policy
approaches can be compared over time. In particular, collecting data
in a standardized way as projects are begun, implemented, and termi-
nated is the only way to amass the data necessary fora rigorous retro-
spective analysis.
The analyses that have been conducted of federal research related
to energy and the environment have reached mixed conclusions.
Cohen and Noll (1991) documented the monumental wasterepre-
sented by the breeder reactor and synthetic fuel programs in the 1970s,
but also concluded that the photovoltaics research program under-
taken in the same time frame had significant benefits. More recently,
the National Research Council attempted a fairly comprehensiveover-
view of energy efficiency and fossil energy research at DOEover
the last two decades (National Research Council 2001). Using both
estimates of overall return and case studies, they concluded,as one
might expect, that there were only a handful of programs that proved
highly valuable. Their estimates of returns suggest, however, that
the benefits of these successes amply justified the overall portfolio
investment.
Perhaps more important than the question of the overall rate ofre-
turn is what distinguishes the successful programs from the failures.
While the small numbers and inherent randomness make it difficult to
draw strong conclusions, it seems that the successful programsare
those in which significant participation by industryin the form of
many firms or consortia rather than individual contractorshelped to
ensure that the photovoltaics, building energy efficiency, and advanced
engine programs produced outputs that are actuallyor potentially of
real commercial value.
There is also some evidence of success for informationprograms
(Anderson and Newell 2003). The Department of Energy provides free
energy audits to small and medium-size companies using university-
based engineering teams recommending energy-saving projects that
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the technology costs, projected energy savings, and adopted recom-
mendations. Overall, about 50 percent of recommended projects are
adopted. These programs are relatively inexpensive and so are proba-
bly earning a reasonable social return. But firms' decisions to adopt
only 50 percent of the projects recommended by the engineering
experts suggest that imperfect information is not the only reason for
nonadoption.
V.Conclusions
Economists generally evaluate public policies that intervene in the mar-
ket economy from the analytical perspective of market failure. When
it comes to green technology, two mutually reinforcing sets of market
failures are at work, which makes it very likely that the rate of invest-
ment in the development and diffusion of such technology is less than
would be socially optimal. There are two generic sets of approaches to
this situation. One is to design environmental policy so that it fosters
the development and diffusion of new technology, by increasing the
perceived market payoff and maximizing flexibility in compliance. The
other is to implement policies aimed directly at the development and
diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.
Theory suggests and empirical research confirms that innovation
and technology diffusion do respond to the incentives of the market
and that properly designed regulation can create such incentives. Some
believe that technology is so responsive to regulatory incentives that
the social cost of environmental regulation is very low, or even nega-
tive, implying that regulation stimulates so much new technology that
society is better off even without consideration of the environment.
Much paper has been consumed (or recycled?) debating this win-win
hypothesis. But there is no significant disagreement that environmental
policy based on incentives rather than command-and-control ap-
proaches maximizes the potential to stimulate cost-effective technology
innovation and diffusion. Yet many existing environmental regulations
retain significant command and control features. Reform of such poli-
cies and flexible design of prospective policies would be socially bene-
ficial. To a significant extent, it does not matter whether the end point
of such reform would be truly win-win or merely achieving the same
environmental objectives at lower (but possibly still substantial) cost.
The double-market failure also suggests that there is a clear case for
broad-based public support of technology innovation and diffusion.62 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
And in cases where private incentives do not reflect the full costs of
environmental externalities, for whatever reason, the optimal policy
mix will include public policies aimed directly at stimulating the devel-
opment and diffusion of new environmentally benign technology. This
argument is particularly strong with respect to those aspects of technol-
ogy development that are most influenced by market failure in the
form of difficulty by private firms in appropriating the returns to inno-
vation and adoption. Technology "infrastructure," such as data collec-
tion and dissemination and the training of scientists and engineers, is
likely to be seriously underprovided by market incentives.
Technology policy that goes beyond basic scientific research and
leans toward the development and diffusion of specific technologies
is politically controversial. There are good reasons for this controversy,
including doubts that the government is efficient at deciding what
aspects of technology to support, and painful experience with ill-
advised initiatives that became difficult to end once political momen-
tum developed behind them. But problems such as global climate
change are too important, and the positive externalities associated with
development and adoption of new technology in this area are too clear
to abandon policy efforts simply because they are hard. Everyone
agrees that there are many ways in which public education is flawed,
but it is not widely suggested that, as a consequence, the govern-
ment should simply get out of the business of education. Rather, we
should try different ways to structure policy in this area to minimize
the known policy problems, such as public-private partnerships that
subsidize research but retain a significant element of market forces
in determining which technologies to pursue. Failure of some poi-
icy initiatives should be expected, and such failure should be used
to terminate or improve particular programs, not to rationalize total
inaction.
A logical counterpart of policy experimentation is systematic policy
evaluation. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure policy suc-
cess when the output is intangible and its effects are manifest in the
economy only over long periods. Indeed, some advocates of public
investment in technology resist quantitative evaluation of technology
programs on the grounds that it is so hard to measure the outputs that
any attempted measurements will necessarily understate the benefits
and hence undermine political support for such programs. But accep-
tance of this approach guarantees perpetuation of our ignorance about
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and thereby consigns technology policy forever to the realm of ideol-
ogy. Technological change is a long-run process,and we should be
willing to take a long-run view, and we should remain hopeful that,
on the time scale of years and decades, systematicevaluation will even-
tually allow the creation of a solid empirical base for the design of
technology policy to maximize its social returns.
Notes
Josef Schumpeter identified three steps in technological change: invention, innovation,
and diffusion. In Schumpeter's trichotomy, invention is the first technical development,
and innovation the first commercial introduction. For simplicity, we have collapsed these
two steps into one and labeled it innovation.
There is, however, an offsetting negative externality because R&D is a fixed cost that
must, in equilibrium, be financed by the stream of quasi-rents it produces. The entry of
another R&D competitor, or an increase in the R&D investment level of a competitor,
reduces the expected quasi-rents earned by other R&D firms. This "rent-stealing"
effect (Mankiw and Whinston 1986) could, as a theoretical matter, lead to over-
investment in R&D. The empirical evidence suggests, however, that positive externalities
associated with knowledge spillovers dominate the rent-stealing effect, leading to social
rates of return for R&D substantially in excess of the private rates of return (Griliches
1992).
See the survey by Evenson and Westphal (1995) on technology and development.
See Majd and Pindyck (1989) for an analysis that explicitly treats learning by doing
as an irreversible investment decision.
More recently, the availability of computerized firm-level data on production
costs, R&D, and patents has led to an increase in parallel analyses in the industrial
sector.
See, for example, Gollop and Roberts (1983), Koistad and Turnovsky (1998), and Yai-
sawarng and Klein (1994).
Of course, there is a parallel problem with respect to measurement of the rate of inven-
tion or innovation. See Griliches (1990) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999).
Of course, one expects long-run responses in general to exceed short-run responses.
But in the absence of induced technological change, diminishing marginal returns would
likely limit the extent of possible substitution effects, even in the long run.
For a detailed survey of the issues in this section, see Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2002).
A considerable amount of theoretical work followed in the 1980s. Although much
of that work characterized its topic as the effects of alternative policy instruments on
technology innovation, the focus was in fact on effects of policy on technology diffusion.
Hence, we defer consideration of those studies to the next section.
See, for example, Greening et al. (1997) and Newell et al. (1999) on appliance effi-
ciency standards, and Goldberg (1998) and Greene (1990) on the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles.64 Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins
For example, studies often use current, realized energy prices as a proxy for expected,
future energy prices. Current prices fluctuate more than expected future prices, however,
leading to a downward bias in the coefficient on the energy price proxy relative to the
true relationship with expected prices.
For a general discussion of support for training and education as a complement to
research subsidies, see Romer (2000).
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